Speech and recognition of other

Habermas discutes with Heidegger

Abstract

This article critically questions the common assertion that "one should not discuss with a fascist." Part-is given Habermas' notion of discourse as a communicative process oriented towards rational understanding. In his notes for the foundation of discourse ethics, Habermas faces the ethical objection, and his refusal to participate in the argument. In his notes, Habermas observes, with Apel, that the ceticism of objecting is itself in performative contradiction. In his absence at the reception of the Kyoto Prize Habermas explained some events as related to his philosophical thought. He highlights his indignation with Heidegger, who republished post-war works without any warning against the context of Nazism in which they were produced. His criticism of him went to the public sphere, where he expressed his criticism. Habermas searched and provoked discussion. In his work naturalism and religion Habermas highlights the relevance of oiling the arguments of two beliefs from his own presuppositions. Habermas advocates that no discourse has any need to converse in the language of belief for a common language with no belief. This is part of the process of reconfirmation of others in their dignity and of their inclusion in political discussion. The presuppositions are presented as arguments for the view that, in democratic and pluralistic societies, there is no room to challenge speech as ethical. Do not limit this to arguing with any interlocutor, including cetics and fascists.